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1. Introduction 
 
There is a striking difference between the legal answer in most countries to the question 
whether non-pecuniary losses should be included in tort damages and the economic approach 
to this topic. As can be seen in the papers presented at this workshop, even though in many 
jurisdictions there is discussion about which non-pecuniary losses should be included in tort 
damages and about how damages for non-pecuniary losses should be assessed, in most 
jurisdictions it is not debated that indeed non-pecuniary losses in principle should be included. 
The economic literature on the other hand does not answer this question unambiguously. From 
an economic point of view, damages in tort law aim to fulfill the goals of deterrence and loss 
spreading.1 Whether these goals can be reached, depends heavily on the calculation of 
damages. If the award of damage compensation correctly reflects all the losses inflicted, the 
tortfeasor may be induced to perform his activities less often and/or more carefully.2 Also for 
the goal of loss spreading it is important that damages reflect the actual losses. After all, if a 
part of the losses is excluded, it will not be subject to the spreading potential of tort law and 
(liability) insurance. 
In the Law and Economics literature, two approaches toward compensation of non-pecuniary 
losses are distinguished. According to the prevention theory, such losses have to be 
compensated, because in order to give optimal incentives to the injurer, damages should 
encompass all losses he may cause, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. The difficulty with non-
pecuniary losses is that they cannot be measured directly, so that we need an indirect method 
to assess them. According to the insurance theory the level of insurance coverage against non-
pecuniary losses is such an indirect method. It argues that compensation for non-pecuniary 
losses depends on whether a rational victim would self-insure against them. We treat the debate 
between both theories in more detail in Section 2.  
In Section 3 we argue that the insurance theory is not a proper indirect way of assessing non-
pecuniary losses, because insurance decisions regard risk aversion rather than the question how 
potential victims view non-pecuniary losses. In our view, so-called ex ante determined 
damages are a better approach. This idea of ex ante determined damages in the economic 
 
* Louis Visscher is professor of Legal Economic Analysis of Tort and Damages at the Rotterdam Institute of Law 
and Economics (RILE) of the Erasmus School of Law at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Vaia Karapanou is 
a researcher in Law and Economics and a lawyer admitted before the Athens Court of Appeals. 
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literature is discussed in the setting of fatalities, but is not elaborated upon in case of non-fatal 
injuries, which in practice is the most important area of non-pecuniary losses. Given this 
importance, in this paper we focus our attention on pain and suffering damages for nonfatal 
injuries. In Section 4 we will explain that in our view, the concept of Quality Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs) from the domain of Health Economics is well suited to act as a measure of ex 
ante determined damages. QALYs regard the impact of diverging health impairments on the 
quality of life and express the value of living one year in a certain health condition and 
encompass the severity and duration of a health impairment.3 These are the essential elements 
which have to be reflected in damages.  
In Section 5 we argue that QALYs can be utilized as a more systematic measure to assess pain 
and suffering damages for personal injuries than the current legal practice.4 The way in which 
non-pecuniary losses are treated and the magnitude of the amounts awarded for their 
compensation varies considerably between and even within countries.5 In several European 
countries, as can be seen in the various papers of this workshop, courts rely on previous 
decisions for similar injuries. In others, courts use injury damage tables, tariffs and guidelines 
and in some jurisdictions courts decide with full discretion. In the USA, juries are provided 
with general, abstract instructions and no meaningful guidance, whereas appellate judges 
reviewing pain and suffering awards may take amounts awarded for similar injuries into 
consideration, but they lack an objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness of the award.6 
In some American jurisdictions, jurors are allowed to use the ‘per diem’ method according to 
which they multiply a unit of time with a dollar amount that corresponds to the plaintiff’s injury 
and then multiply the result with the plaintiff’s life expectancy.7 Diverging practices lead to 
unpredictable and varying damages, which in our view frequently do not reflect the true 
magnitude of the loss inflicted. A correct assessment of damages would involve not only 
incorporating all incurred losses in the compensation award but also calculating the damages 
in a consistent way, taking into consideration objective criteria for the assessment, such as 
duration and severity in cases of personal injury. Existing legal frameworks cannot adequately 
evaluate such aspects.  
In Section 6 we provide several examples which show how QALYs can be used for the 
assessment of pain and suffering damages. Exactly because QALYs incorporate the severity 
and duration of health impairments, they can serve as an external framework for pain and 
suffering damages assessment. This way, such damages can be founded on their very basis, 
being the impact of the personal injury on the quality of life of the victim.  
In Section 7 we conclude. 
 
 
2. Non-pecuniary damages in the Law and Economics literature 
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7 Poser, Bornstein & McGorty, 2003, 63-64; Avraham, 2006, 90-92. 
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2.1 Losses and damages 
 
In Law and Economics the impact of law on social welfare, which is often seen as the sum of 
the utility levels of the members of society, is analyzed.8 In the economic analysis of tort law, 
losses are seen as a decrease in the level of utility of the victim. Such losses hence lower social 
welfare. Tort liability can provide incentives to the relevant actors to take measures (e.g. taking 
more care or reducing the activity level) which may avoid such losses or reduce the probability 
of their occurrence. Such measures entail costs themselves, so that a weighing has to be made 
between the costs of such precautionary measures on the one hand and the losses they may 
avoid on the other. In principle, tort damages should result in full compensation, because only 
then the full decrease in utility will be weighed against the cost of precautionary measures, 
thereby providing desirable behavioral incentives to potential tortfeasors.9 Losses which are 
too expensive to avoid, should subsequently be optimally spread, because concentrated losses 
cost more utility than spread losses.10 
The distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses is made as follows. In case of a 
pecuniary loss, the victim loses money or replaceable goods. The damages received by the 
victim make up for the loss in money or enable him to replace the lost goods.11 In case of a 
non-pecuniary loss, non-replaceable ‘goods’ such as e.g. family portraits, but also health and 
emotional well-being are lost or damaged.12 The damages received by the victim do not enable 
him to replace the lost goods. The money yields utility, but it does not mend the immaterial 
losses. 
Cooter and Ulen spend attention to the problem of how courts should assign a money value to 
non-pecuniary losses. The idea of perfect compensation, meaning that the amount of 
compensation brings the victim back to the same utility level he had before the accident, is ‘the 
right goal for courts trying to internalize costs, but implementing the goal is difficult for 
intangible, but real, harms’.13 This is so because it is not possible to observe and measure this 
subjective loss, and also because the idea of perfect compensation fails in situations where the 
money received does not make up for the immaterial loss. Cooter and Ulen describe that these 
problems have resulted in the same court awarding different amounts for victims with identical 
injuries, and of course also different courts awarding different amounts for identical injuries. 
This is an issue to which we return in Section 6. 
 
 
2.2 Prevention theory and insurance theory 
 
Within Law and Economics, two approaches exist regarding the question whether immaterial 
losses should be compensated. The first, the ‘prevention theory’, is already described above: 
In order to provide the potential injurer with the correct behavioral incentives, he has to 
 
8 See e.g. Arlen 2000, p. 683; Posner 2003, p. 24ff; Shavell 2004, p. 2; Schäfer and Ott 2004, p. 47. 
9 For the exceptions, see e.g. Arlen 2000, p. 682; Visscher 2009, p. 156ff. 
10 This is due to the decreasing marginal utility of wealth, which is further explained in Section 2.2. 
11 Arlen 2000, p. 683. 
12 Shavell 1987, p. 133; Arlen 2000, p. 697ff; Shavell 2004, p. 242. 
13 Cooter and Ulen 2012, p. 192. 
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compensate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, because both types constitute losses to 
the victim. If the injurer does not face both types of losses in the expected damages, he does 
not fully internalize the negative externalities of his behavior, and tort law then cannot reach 
its preventive goal.14 The prevention theory hence focuses on Calabresi’s primary accident 
costs (i.e. the sum of the costs of preventive measures and the losses that are still expected to 
occur)15 and weighs the additional costs of care measures against the resulting decrease in 
expected accident losses (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary). So, according to the prevention 
theory non-pecuniary losses should be included in tort damages. However, it does not answer 
the question how such losses can be assessed. 
 
Ott and Schäfer discuss this problem that non-pecuniary losses are difficult to assess. Given 
that these losses do not have a market value, the authors argue that one should determine in an 
indirect way how many resources should be spent on precautionary measures. A possible way 
to do this is to investigate how much money people are willing to spend on insurance against 
non-pecuniary losses.16 This approach is referred to as the ‘insurance theory’. Compensation 
should only be provided for losses against which rational individuals would purchase 
insurance, so it is argued. If they would not buy insurance against immaterial losses, tort law 
should not force such coverage upon them.17 This especially holds in situations where these 
people would ultimately pay for this coverage via an increase in the price of the products, 
services or activities involved. Tort damages are regarded as a way to cover losses and hence 
they serve a similar goal as insurance, for which the person who receives the coverage pays a 
price.18 
In case of pecuniary losses, people want to buy insurance because money has a decreasing 
marginal utility: with the first money someone acquires, he will fulfil his most important needs, 
so that this money yields much utility. The more money someone already has, the less 
additional utility additional money will yield, because it will be spent on less important needs. 
In case of a pecuniary loss, after the accident someone has less wealth left than before the 
accident. Money after the accident therefore has a higher marginal utility because the person 
involved has less of it than before the accident. Insurance allows people to distribute resources 
across the different states of the world, in such a way that they improve their situation.19 In 
essence, one shifts money with a relatively low marginal utility in the pre-accident situation 
(the premium paid) to the post-accident situation (the insurance coverage) where the money 
has a higher marginal utility. Therefore people are willing to pay an insurance premium in order 
to receive money after the accident.  
With non-pecuniary losses, according to the insurance theory this line of reasoning does not 
hold. Cook and Graham explain this by using the concept of a ransom, i.e. the maximum 
 
14 Adams, 1989, 213, 214; Ott & Schäfer, 1990, 566; Arlen, 2000, 702; Shavell, 2004, 242; Cooter & Ulen, 2012, 
191ff. 
15 Calabresi 1977. 
16 Ott & Schäfer, 1990, 566. 
17 Shavell, 1987, 228ff; Adams, 1989, 216, 217; Schäfer & Ott, 1990, 568; Pryor, 1993, 101ff; Shavell, 2004, 
269ff. 
18 Rubin and Calfee 1992, p. 250; Arlen 1993, p. 117; Geistfeld 1995, p. 793ff; King 2004, p. 184. 
19 Croley & Hanson, 1995, 1822. 
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amount an individual would be willing to pay to avoid losing an irreplaceable commodity. In 
situations of replaceable commodities and actuarial fair premiums, the individual will fully 
insure. However, if the commodity is irreplaceable but ‘normal’ (in the sense that the individual 
is willing to pay a higher ransom if he has a higher level of wealth), he will not buy full 
insurance. Cook and Graham show that in such a case the marginal utility of wealth is lower in 
the state where the individual loses the irreplaceable commodity than the marginal utility of 
wealth after paying the ransom in the state where he does not lose it. This result indicates that 
an individual would only buy full insurance coverage for a replaceable commodity and leads 
the authors to the conclusion that ‘the goal of full compensation to victims of violent crime or 
accidents that result in injury or death is not compatible with economic efficiency’ and that 
‘full compensation is an inefficient policy for tort settlements that involve irreplaceable 
commodities’. 20 
Danzon argues that full compensation is only optimal for purely monetary losses. However, 
for injuries which affect the utility of wealth, optimal compensation is higher if the accident 
increases the marginal utility of wealth, and lower if it decreases it.21 Whether disability 
increases or decreases marginal utility of wealth cannot be determined theoretically. Danzon 
investigates whether people take out full insurance coverage against non-pecuniary losses and 
whether such losses are included in compulsory public coverage. The results she finds indicate 
that full coverage for all losses ‘far exceeds the coverage people are prepared to pay for given 
the choice’.22 
Friedman states that marginal utility of wealth will actually decrease due to bodily injuries, 
because such injuries eliminate ways in which the individual can spend his wealth. If the 
individual now reallocates his wealth to different activities than before the accident, these 
activities necessarily have a lower marginal utility, because otherwise he would have spent 
more on it already before the accident. Hence, full compensation is inefficient.23 Empirical 
research allegedly corroborates the idea that injuries reduce the marginal utility of wealth.24 
Summarizing the line of reasoning of the insurance theory: because non-pecuniary losses do 
not involve a loss of wealth, marginal utility of wealth does not increase, and likely decreases, 
after the accident. A rational individual hence is not willing to buy insurance, because paying 
the premium costs more utility than the expected insurance coverage yields after the accident. 
Since the victim is not willing to self-insure against non-pecuniary losses, tort law should not 
force such coverage upon him. 
 
 
2.3. Criticism regarding the insurance theory 
 
It follows that according to the prevention theory the injurer should be liable for the immaterial 
losses he has caused, but according to the insurance theory the victim should not receive 
 
20 Cook & Graham, 1977, 151, 155. 
21 Danzon, 1984, 520, 521. 
22 Danzon, 1984, 524. Also see Croley & Hanson, 1995, 1801. 
23 Friedman, 1982, 82. 
24 Viscusi & Evans, 1990; Evans & Viscusi, 1991, 102ff. 
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compensation for these losses. However, several authors have expressed criticism regarding 
the viewpoint of the insurance theory that marginal utility of wealth would decrease or stay the 
same after suffering a non-pecuniary loss. These authors challenge the conclusion that rational 
people would not want to self-insure against non-pecuniary losses. 
Croley and Hanson argue that people do want to insure against non-pecuniary losses because 
such losses lower their ‘baseline utility’.25 The authors distinguish between ‘baseline-
independent’ utility and ‘baseline-dependent’ utility. According to this distinction, the overall 
well-being of an individual (his baseline utility) affects the marginal utility of wealth under 
certain conditions, while it does not under other conditions. They provide a clear example of 
baseline-dependent utility: in deciding which of two friends to give an opera ticket, the friend 
who enjoys opera more in principle will derive more utility from the ticket. However, if the 
other friend has a difficult period in his life, an evening out (whether it is the opera or something 
else) might give him much utility, given that his baseline is so low. Therefore, it could be that 
the second friend derives more utility from the ticket, even though the first friend likes opera 
better.  
The authors furthermore argue that individuals may use insurance not only to substitute money 
with a low marginal utility for money with a high marginal utility, but also to increase the 
baseline utility in the post-accident state. Therefore, people may want to take out insurance 
against non-pecuniary losses after all.26  
However, imperfect information regarding the extent of the non-pecuniary losses, the 
probability of their occurrence and the compensation needed, countervailing social norms in 
the form of societal rejection of pricing pain and sorrow and legal restrictions such as the 
indemnity principle prevent manifestation of demand for such insurance. 27 The authors argue 
that in practice there is such insurance available, albeit under different names. They provide 
the example of first party accident insurance that compensates the insured when he is legally 
entitled to recover damages from an uninsured, judgment proof motorist. This insurance also 
covers non-pecuniary losses.28  
On the supply side of the insurance market, adverse selection and moral hazard occur due to 
limited monitoring possibilities regarding non-pecuniary losses. This may prevent insurers to 
satisfy consumers demand.29 
Pryor argues that the conclusion from the insurance theory that the marginal utility of wealth 
remains the same or even decreases after suffering non-pecuniary losses is flawed. First, 
empirical research in this area is based on the viewpoint of nondisabled. Given their 
informational problems and their inability to assess how a disability may transform ones 
preferences, values, desires, et cetera, Pryor doubts whether they can provide accurate 
statements about marginal utility of money after a disability. She assesses that these problems 
will lead to an underestimation of marginal utility.30 Furthermore, she argues that although the 
insurance theory makes the compensation of losses conditional on whether they are pecuniary 
 
25 Croley & Hanson, 1995, 1815. 
26 Croley & Hanson, 1995, 1827, 1834. 
27 Croley & Hanson, 1995, 1827, 1845ff. 
28 Croley & Hanson, 1995, 1827, 1862ff. 
29 Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 1989, 934. 
30 Pryor, 1993, 110ff. 
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or non-pecuniary, it does not provide clear guidelines regarding this distinction and thus does 
not clarify which part of the losses should be compensated and which part not.31 
In the literature, decoupling liability is sometimes suggested as a solution to the tension 
between prevention theory and insurance theory.32 Under decoupled liability the injurer pays 
an amount reflecting all the losses he has caused, while the victim only receives an amount 
equivalent to what he would have spent for insurance coverage. The payment of the injurer 
hence exceeds compensation to the victim and the idea is that the extra amount is collected by 
the state in the form of a fine. In our view this would even worsen the position of the victims: 
they pay an increased price (because the injurer is liable for the non-pecuniary losses) but they 
do not receive coverage! If damages paid by the injurers could ex ante be distributed over all 
victims this problem would not occur. However, such a system may not be feasible in practice. 
Another proposal to address the tension is to develop a market in unmatured tort claims.33 
Potential victims could sell their future tort claims to third parties and injurers (and/or their 
insurers) could buy them. If an accident would then materialize, no litigation would be 
necessary. Injurers will have an incentive to take precautionary measures to reduce the cost of 
the claim and potential victims will be required to buy insurance to cover the loss from the sold 
future tort claim. However, this solution is problematic not only because the conclusion of 
contracts is not possible for tort cases where parties are perfect strangers but also because 
bargaining and informational problems may impede the transaction of tort claims, hence 
inhibiting the creation of a market in unmatured tort claims in the first place. 
It follows that the most important Law and Economics proposals so far to provide a measure 
of non-pecuniary damages involve either the interference of the state or arranging non-
pecuniary damages through contract. In our view, a better indirect way of assessing non-
pecuniary damages is possible within tort law as explained in the sections below. 
 
 
3. Ex ante determined damages 
 
The authors discussed in Section 2.3 all question whether the conclusion from the insurance 
theory that rational individuals do not want to self-insure against non-pecuniary losses is 
correct. However, even if the insurance theory would be correct so that a rational person would 
not self-insure against non-pecuniary losses, this in our view should not lead to the conclusion 
that tort damages should not encompass such losses. Insurance decisions relate to the risk 
attitude of the actors involved, but not to how they experience the potential loss. 
A better indirect way of assessing non-pecuniary damages is to study how many resources the 
potential victim is willing to spend in order to avoid non-pecuniary losses, or at least to reduce 
the probability of suffering such losses.34 These resources are, in the view of the potential 
victim, equivalent to avoiding (or reducing the probability of suffering) the non-pecuniary 
 
31 Pryor, 1993, 125ff. 
32 See Spence, 1977; Polinsky & Che, 1991; Arlen, 2000, 706ff. 
33 Cooter, 1989. 
34 Also see Friedman, 1982, 83 and 85; Danzon, 1984, 526; Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 1989, 913; Ott & 
Schäfer, 1990, 568; Geistfeld, 1995, 779; Arlen, 2000, 703ff; Schäfer & Ott, 2005, 371; Cooter & De Pianto, 
2013, 447. 
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losses and they form the basis of so-called ex ante determined damages. Such damages provide 
the correct deterrent incentives to the potential tortfeasor, who correctly internalizes the costs 
the victim would be willing to spend on accident avoidance. In addition, the victim is not ‘over-
insured’ against his will, because the amounts are based on the expenditures he himself would 
be willing to make.  
 
This line of reasoning can be further explained with the use of Figure 1 below. Wealth is shown 
on the horizontal axis, the utility it yields on the vertical axis. The decreasing marginal utility 
of wealth is shown by the shape of the utility curve: the more wealth someone already has, the 
less utility a given increase in wealth adds so that the curve becomes flatter. If a person who 
starts in position A on utility curve U1 suffers a pecuniary loss of €5,000 which brings him to 
point B on the same curve, marginal utility of wealth has increased because the curve is steeper 
in point B. This implies that an additional euro in point B adds more utility than an additional 
euro in point A. However, if our person instead of a pecuniary loss suffers a non-pecuniary 
loss which does not affect his wealth, he shifts from point A to point C on the lower utility 
curve U2. This downward shift reflects that for all wealth levels, utility is now lower than 
before. The vertical difference between U1 and U2 therefore represents the decrease in utility 
caused by the non-pecuniary loss. The slope of the curves in A and C is identical, reflecting 
the argument of the insurance theory that our victim does not want to insure against such 
losses.35  
 
Figure 1 – insurance, ex ante determined damages and ex post determined damages 
 
 
 
 
35 Note that in Figure 1 the utility curve keeps the same form and is merely shifted downward. This reflects the 
argument of the insurance theory that marginal utility of wealth stays the same after a non-pecuniary loss, which 
in this section is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument. If marginal utility of wealth would decrease, the 
curve would become flatter, and if it would increase the curve would become steeper. This in itself does not 
change the line of reasoning of the current section, which focuses on the ex ante willingness to pay to avoid the 
loss, and not on the marginal utility of wealth. 
  9 
Figure 1 also shows that the utility level of our victim is identical in point B and C. This implies 
that he is indifferent between losing €5,000 (bringing him to B) on the one hand and suffering 
the non-pecuniary loss (bringing him to C) on the other. Therefore, this person is willing to 
spend up to €5,000 in exchange for not suffering the non-pecuniary loss. This €5,000 is his ex 
ante willingness to pay (‘WTP’) to avoid the loss. In other words, expressed in monetary terms 
the victim himself assesses the non-pecuniary loss at €5,000. This implies that the injurer 
should also take this amount into consideration in weighing the costs and benefits of taking any 
precautionary measures. If we now base tort damages on this €5,000 we indeed incentivize the 
potential tortfeasor to take care measures which cost less than €5,000, which is desirable 
behavior.  
Note that the traditional legal idea of ex post determined damages aims at bringing a victim 
back to the utility level he had before the accident. In terms of Figure 1, the victim should then 
receive damages bringing him from point C (after having suffered the losses) to point D (with 
the same utility level as in the status quo ante). Given decreasing marginal utility of wealth, 
these ex post determined damages by definition exceed the ex ante determined damages. In 
Figure 1 they would amount to about €7,000. Such damages hence incentivize potential 
tortfeasors to take care measures which cost up to €7,000, which is more than the €5,000 at 
which the victim himself assessed the non-pecuniary loss. Ex post determined damages hence 
result in over-deterrence, so that ex ante determined damages in our view are better.  
If the non-pecuniary loss in Figure 1 would have been more severe, the situation could occur 
that the original utility level could not be attained anymore, because the highest point on curve 
U2 would lie below the utility level of point A. In such cases, the victim cannot be fully 
compensated in the ex post view. However, it is then still possible to determine an ex ante WTP 
to avoid the loss and to use that as basis for non-pecuniary damages. 
 
In figure 1 we have assumed an ex ante care measure which can actually avoid the loss. In 
practice, most care measures will only reduce the probability of such losses occurring, but they 
will not fully eliminate the risk. In principle, every person who is exposed to the risk should 
receive from the injurer the amount this person was willing to pay to avoid the risk, whether or 
not the risk has materialized. That way, victims would be indifferent between not running the 
risk on the one hand and running the risk but receiving the amount they were willing to spend 
on accident avoidance on the other hand. Victims are then ex ante compensated for the risk 
they run, and injurers receive adequate behavioral incentives because they pay for the expected 
harm caused by their activities. For example, assume that potential victims are willing to spend 
up to €100 to reduce the probability of suffering a certain non-pecuniary loss by one per mille. 
If an injurer who exposes these potential victims to this risk would have to pay €100 to each of 
them, irrespective of whether the risk materializes, the potential victims are adequately 
compensated for this risk and the injurer internalizes the risk he has created. However, given 
that under tort law the injurer can only be held liable if he indeed has caused losses, only those 
persons for whom the risk actually has materialized can receive damages. By multiplying the 
amount the victim was willing to pay to avoid the risk by the reciprocal of the accident 
probability, the same result can be reached: the injurer pays the amount which the victim was 
willing to spend on accident avoidance. This implies that the injurer from the above example 
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should pay €100,000 (€100/0.001) to the one-in-a-thousand victims for whom the risk 
materializes.36 Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, non-pecuniary losses should be 
compensated on the basis of the resources that the victim would have spent himself on reducing 
the expected accident losses. 
 
However, the ex ante WTP is not easily observable and may differ per person. From an 
economic perspective, however, it is not necessary to assess damages correctly in all individual 
cases, as long as they are correct on average.37 We are therefore looking for an average ex ante 
WTP to avoid losses. A well-known example is the so-called Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), 
which concerns how many resources people are willing to spend on reducing the probability 
of fatal accidents.38 The VSL is derived from decisions which people take and which influence 
health and safety, such as buying a dangerous product or choosing a risky job. Such choices 
contain an implicit tradeoff between money and safety, indicating people’s WTP to reduce the 
probability of fatal accidents. On the basis of these tradeoffs, the VSL is estimated. The 
resulting amounts differ greatly, but according to Sunstein, the VSL in 2004 was set at about 
$6.1 million,39 while in 2013 it was assessed at about $9 million.40 From the VSL, which 
encompasses both the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary losses, according to Miller 50-75% 
consists of immaterial losses.41 
Schäfer and Ott argue that compensation for pain and suffering for non-fatal injuries should be 
some fraction of the value attached to the WTP to prevent death. They do, however, not suggest 
how to determine the appropriate fractions, and neither do the other authors.42  
We argue that the concept of QALYs enables us to extend the idea of ex ante compensation to 
non-fatal injuries, because it offers a systematic way to assess immaterial losses in such cases. 
In our view, such a framework is currently missing in the economic approach of non-pecuniary 
losses. It enables determining the ‘fractions’ Schäfer and Ott were mentioning, this way 
providing a basis for assessing ex ante determined pain and suffering damages for non-fatal 
injuries. 
 
 
4. Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) 
 
A QALY is a measure regarding the value of living one year in a certain health condition. This 
health condition is used as a proxy for the quality of life during that year. QALYs are used in 
evaluating whether different health programs, medical treatments and techniques yield enough 
 
36 See e.g. Friedman, 1982, 85ff; Rubin & Calfee, 1992, 249; Geistfeld, 1995, 825; Cooter 2003, p. 1112ff; Schäfer 
& Ott 2004, p. 246; Cooter & Ulen, 2012, 253ff; Cooter & De Pianto, 2013, 453ff. Note that Cooter and Cooter 
& DePianto do not use the victim’s willingness to pay as basis for the calculations, but one or more care measures 
which in society are regarded as reasonable care measures. 
37 Kaplow, 1994, 313ff; Kaplow & Shavell, 1996, 194. 
38 Sunstein, 2004; Sunstein & Posner, 2005; for a review article see Viscusi & Aldy, 2003. 
39 Sunstein, 2004, 205. 
40 Sunstein, 2014, 7. 
41 Miller, 1989, 893-894. 
42 Schäfer & Ott, 2005, 373. 
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benefits to be worth their costs.43 When combined with a monetary value, QALYs can be seen 
as a societal WTP to avoid health conditions or to cure them. 
Each condition is assigned a QALY-weight, varying from 0.00 (death) to 1.00 (perfect health). 
Conditions which are regarded as worse than death have a negative value. The total QALY-
loss caused by a condition is calculated by multiplying the decrease in QALY-weight by the 
duration of the condition.44 Suppose that two treatments exist which are equally expensive. 
Treatment A increases the quality of life with 0.1 for 5 years, treatment B by 0.2 for 3 years. 
Treatment B is then preferred, because it yields 0.6 QALY (0.2*3) while treatment A ‘only’ 
yields 0.5 QALY for the same amount of money. 
Different methods exist for establishing QALY weights.45 In some methods, respondents are 
asked to compare two situations in order to elicit their overall perception of a specific ailment. 
In the standard gamble method, people are asked to choose between living in a certain health 
condition on the one hand, and undergoing treatment which, with varying probabilities, leads 
to either perfect health or death on the other hand. The lowest probability of living in perfect 
health which the respondents still assess as high enough to undergo the treatment determines 
the QALY weight of the ailment. Indifference between living with the ailment or undergoing 
a treatment with a 70% probability of success and a 30% probability of death, results in a 
QALY weight of the ailment of 0.7.  
In the time trade-off method, respondents trade off x years in perfect health with y years with a 
certain health condition. If respondents assess 40 years life expectancy with the ailment as 
equal to 30 years in perfect health, the QALY factor is 30/40 = 0.75. 
In the person trade-off, respondents are e.g. asked to choose between improving the health or 
extending life expectancy of x people in the first (better) condition and y people in the second 
(worse) condition.46 If respondents are indifferent between extending life with one year for 20 
healthy people and 25 people with a certain health condition, then the QALY-weight of the 
second health condition is 20/25 = 0.8.  
In the visual analogue scale, respondents are asked to rank the ailment on a vertical line with 
concrete endpoints ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 represents death (or the worst imaginable 
health condition) and 100 represents perfect health (or the best imaginable health condition).  
 
Other methods, frequently referred to as ‘generic’ or ‘quality of life’ measures, establish a 
QALY-weight for the quality of life of the health condition involved, taking into consideration 
both affected and unaffected health aspects.  
The EuroQoL EQ-5D questionnaire differentiates health states using five dimensions: 
mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. Respondents are 
asked to mark their health condition on the basis of these five dimensions by indicating whether 
they have no problems, moderate problems or extreme problems in each dimension.47 Each of 
these levels is assigned a weight previously elicited by the visual analogue scale or the time 
 
43 Brazier et al., 1999, 3-4; Dolan, 2000; Folland, Goodman & Stano, 2007, 81. 
44 Hammitt, 2002, 986-987; Adler, 2006, 2. 
45 Nord, 1992, 561ff; Johannesson, Jönsson & Karlsson, 1996, 283-284; Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 1997, 155-
157; Brazier at al., 1999, 23ff; Dolan, 2000, 1733ff; U.S. EPA, 2001, 16-17; Hammitt, 2002, 994-996. 
46 U.S. EPA, 2001, 17; Hammitt, 2002, 995. 
47 Oemar & Oppe, 2013, 3-8. 
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trade off method. Subsequently respondents rank their health condition on a visual analogue 
scale thus communicating their overall perception of the ailment. In a newer version of the 
questionnaire two levels are added (slight problems and severe problems), enabling a more 
fine-tuned assessment.  
The Health Utilities Index Mark 3 (HUI3) uses eight dimensions to classify health states: 
vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity, emotion, cognition and pain.48 Each dimension 
comprises five or six different levels indicative of a gradual deterioration in that dimension. 
These levels are assigned a weight previously elicited by standard gamble and visual analogue 
scale methods.  
Other generic measures to elicit QALY weights are the ‘Quality of Well Being Scale’, the ‘SF-
6D’, the ‘15D’ and the ‘Rosser disability/distress scale’. However, so far the EQ-5D and the 
HUI3 are regarded as better measures for the QALY weight elicitation.49 
 
The different methods may lead to different results, among others due to the type of questions 
being asked and the comparison being made (with death, perfect health or with another 
ailment). Furthermore it is relevant whether the questions are asked to people who actually 
have the ailment or not, to doctors or other health specialists. Applying QALYs to assess pain 
and suffering damages therefore does not result in one unique amount, but the research does 
provide the boundaries between which damages could vary (see Section 6 below for examples).  
If people with the ailment are regarded as more competent for the elicitation of QALY weights, 
the question then becomes when to ask them. People can adapt to their life circumstances so 
that an evaluation of the health condition shortly after it is incurred may differ from a later 
evaluation.50 A full discussion of whether adaptation should be included in tort damages lies 
beyond the scope of this paper, but this issue is heavily debated. On the one hand, compensating 
people for a lasting loss of enjoyment of life (so-called ‘hedonic damages’) while in practice 
they adapt to the new situation would result in excessive damages.51 Proponents of this view 
note that incorporating adaptation would not imply that the victim should receive (almost) no 
damages at all. After all, even if there is no or only little hedonic loss, the victim may have lost 
a ‘capability’ for which he should receive damages: ‘When people have lost a capability, they 
have lost something significant from the normative point of view, even if they have suffered 
no hedonic loss’.52 On the other hand, if the victim learns to cope with his situation, lowers his 
expectation in life and over time forgets how it was to be fully healthy, this does not necessarily 
imply that the injurer should benefit from this adaptation through lower damages.53 He did 
cause these losses, even if the victim has learned to live with them. 
Setting this discussion aside, it should nevertheless be noted that QALYs elicited by ‘generic’ 
or ‘quality of life’ measures are able to incorporate possible adaptation but still reflect the loss 
of capabilities. For example an adapted paralyzed victim may indicate that he is ‘happy’ or 
‘somewhat happy’ in the emotion-dimension of HUI3, while at the same time for ambulation 
 
48 Horsman et al., 2003. 
49 Brazier et al., 1999. 
50 Dolan, 2000, 1738-1739; Bagenstos & Schlanger, 2007, 763-765. 
51 See e.g. Sunstein, 2008, 160-166; Bagenstos & Schlanger, 2007, 748, 769ff; Ubel & Loewenstein, 2008, 198ff. 
52 Sunstein, 2008, 178. Also see Ubel & Loewenstein, 2008, 206ff. 
53 Menzel et al, 2002, 2151ff. 
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he may answer that he ‘cannot walk at all’. The combination of answers to all questions in the 
HUI3 determines the QALY-weight for the specific injury. Damages based on QALYs could 
therefore reflect both issues. In Sections 5 and 6 below we will explain in more detail how 
QALYs could help in the assessment of pain and suffering damages. 
 
 
5. Pain and suffering damages based on QALYs 
 
The extensive QALY research provides information about the average QALY losses due to 
certain health impairments. Combining this information with the (expected) duration of 
impairments resulting from non-fatal accidents enables a relative ranking of non-pecuniary 
losses. This way it is possible to make an ex ante assessment of non-fatal injuries based on their 
severity and duration. Finally, to be able to estimate pain and suffering damages we need to 
know the WTP per QALY.54  
Two basic approaches exist to attach a monetary value to the QALY. The first bases the 
monetary value of a QALY upon the cost of the last treatment that is implemented within a 
fixed health care budget.55 An overview of the relevant literature shows that health treatments 
have been considered cost-effective and have been implemented when their cost lies between 
approximately €38,100 and €190,600 per QALY.56 The so-called kidney dialysis value which 
is based on the consideration that kidney dialysis is a treatment which is (more than) worth its 
costs, poses a limit of about €84,800 to €108,900 for one QALY.57 The National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence in the UK uses a lower limit of £20,000-£30,000 (about €24,800-€37,200) 
per QALY.58  
The second approach that has been followed to attach a monetary value to a QALY involves 
obtaining people’s WTP for a QALY.59 One way to achieve this is by eliciting people’s WTP 
for small QALY gains.60 If for instance an individual is willing to pay €5,000 for a treatment 
that improves her health by 0.05 QALYs, then the value of one QALY for the individual is 
 
54 In Health Economics, the final step to conclude the evaluation of different health treatments involves comparing 
them on the basis of both QALYs generated and costs incurred to implement them. See e.g. Johannesson & 
Weinstein, 1993, 466; Bleichrodt & Quiggin, 1999, 683ff; Dolan & Edlin, 2002, 828; Klose, 2003 
55 Phelps & Mushlin, 1991, 18; Johannesson & Weinstein, 1993, 466-467; Brazier et al., 2007, 276-277 
56 Kenkel, 2006, 421. He refers to Kaplan & Bush 1982, 74. The amounts in this section have been calculated first 
by expressing the amounts from the original American publications in dollars from 2014 (see 
www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm), and subsequently in Euros on the basis of the 2014 Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) of the Euro area as published by the OECD: 0.777 (see 
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PPPGDP). Acknowledging the differences between the PPP of the 
Member States, the PPP for the Euro area is applied henceforth to avoid having to list separate amounts for all 
Member States. 
57 The kidney dialysis value that has been extensively cited is actually $50,000 per QALY. However since this 
figure has remained static for years Hirth et al., 2000, 333 provide upper and lower estimates that are more up to 
date.  
58 NICE, 2013, 66-67. The amounts are converted to Euro by using the annual average exchange rate of 2014 
published by European Central Bank. UK pound sterling/euro=0.80612.  
These amounts have been criticized as NICE has been using the same range of £20,000 - £30,000 as the acceptable 
cost per QALY for many years.  
59 Johannesson & Meltzer, 1998, 4-6. 
60 Robinson et al, 2013, 92-104. 
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€100,000 (€5000/0.05). This method, among others, has been applied in a European project 
under the name ‘European Value of a Quality Adjusted Life Year’ (EuroVaQ) which aimed at 
determining a monetary value of a QALY for ten European countries over the period 2007-
2010.61 According to the results, the overall mean WTP per QALY over all ten countries is at 
most approximately €69,000.62 Another study from the Netherlands found the WTP for a 
QALY from a societal perspective to be between €53,300 and €85,000.63 The alternative way 
used to derive WTP values for a QALY is to extrapolate them from existing WTP values readily 
found in VSL literature.64 In an overview from 2000 where QALY values are based on VSL-
research, an amount of about €304,000 is mentioned as a median value of the different 
estimates while 30 out of the 35 estimates exceed €57,300 for a QALY.65 Miller assesses the 
monetary value of a QALY on the basis of a regression-based meta-analysis of 68 studies 
regarding the VSL and arrives at a value of about €186,100 for a QALY.66 The ‘European 
Value of a Quality Adjusted Life Year’ project also estimated the value of a QALY by using 
country-specific VSL and average life expectancy and by isolating potential income effects. 
The resulting amounts were approximately €75,600 for the Netherlands and about €77,800 for 
the UK.67  
In order to avoid confusion, it should be stressed that the above amounts only relate to the 
impact of the health impairments on the quality of life, namely the immaterial loss due to an 
injury, and do not incorporate pecuniary losses. In the EuroVaQ, for example, the following 
instruction was included: ‘When you are thinking about what it would be worth to you to avoid 
this (the health state under consideration, LV/VK), please try to forget about any loss of income 
that might happen as a result of being in the [target] health state - please suppose that your 
income is unaffected - and just focus on how that state would affect your quality of life’.68 If 
QALYs would be applied in the way we suggest, they would therefore only encompass non-
pecuniary losses, not also pecuniary losses. 
For our purpose of providing a basis for assessing the correct ex ante determined compensation 
for non-pecuniary losses, only the QALY values derived with the second monetization 
approach are relevant, especially the ones involving direct elicitation of WTP per QALY. The 
QALY values arrived at on the basis of fixed health care budgets under the first approach are 
submitted to constraints which are of no relevance for pain and suffering damages and hence 
they should not be used for their assessment. By combining the information available regarding 
the average QALY losses due to an injury with the amounts people are willing to spend for a 
QALY, we can arrive at the value of ‘ex ante determined pain and suffering damages’.  
 
 
61 EuroVaQ, 2010, 35ff. 
62 This amount resulted by using the ‘direct approach’ and an expected gain of 0.05 QALYs. 
63 Bobinac et al 2013. The amounts arrived at in the study lie between €52,000 and €83,000. These amounts are 
expressed in Euros from 2014 on the basis of the annual average inflation rates published by Eurostat.  
64 Johannesson & Meltzer, 1998, 5; Hirth et al., 2000, 335; Kenkel, 2006, 427. 
65 Hirth et al., 2000, 338-339. 
66 Miller, 2000, 161. 
67 EuroVaQ, 2010, 20-30. The original amounts in the publication (before adjusting for 2014 inflation) are €69,399 
and €68,359. 
68 EuroVaQ, 2010, 50. 
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In the following examples, we use the QALY-weights provided by specialized QALY research, 
which enable an educated assessment of the QALY loss due to an injury.69 The above overview 
makes clear that there is no consensus regarding a ‘correct’ monetized value of a QALY.70 
Factors that certainly should come into play when deciding which monetary value of a QALY 
will be applied for the assessment of pain and suffering damages are, among others, the results 
of ongoing research in health economics, the economic situation of a country, GDP and the 
input from consultation with insurance companies and other potentially involved parties like 
for instance consumer organizations etc. The amounts therefore may differ per country. Thus, 
although the monetary value assigned to the QALY is largely affected by research results, it 
will ultimately be a product of multilevel consultation and of political decision. Even though 
research results do not stipulate a single ‘correct’ monetized value of a QALY, the amounts 
arrived at by the EuroVaQ and by other researches provide at least the scope, within which the 
value of a QALY should lie. In the ensuing analysis, we apply a value of €50,000 per QALY 
to estimate pain and suffering damages for different injuries. We do not argue that this is the 
best possible amount, but until more research is undertaken to determine if a different amount 
may be better suited to assess pain and suffering damages, it makes sense to apply an amount 
that lies within the range of values stipulated by the most recent EuroVaQ project. A relatively 
high discount rate of 4% is also used to express future monetary amounts in present values71 
in order to avoid overestimating non-pecuniary losses due to inadequate discounting. The 
calculations in Section 6 serve as an illustration of the amounts of pain and suffering damages 
which would result from our estimation of a monetized QALY. We juxtapose these amounts 
to actual amounts awarded in several European countries for these health conditions resulting 
from personal injuries as a brief illustration of how the ex ante determined damages approach 
based on QALYs could be utilized.  
 
 
6. Legal and economic standards compared 
 
In this section, we illustrate the approach we propose by three concrete examples and we 
compare the resulting pain and suffering damages with the amounts which were actually 
awarded in several European countries.72 
 
 
6.1 Amputation of foot and lower extremities 
 
 
69 Our approach hence differs from Miller (2000), who suggests that in each and every individual case, experts 
should determine the QALY loss of the victim. We, on the contrary, propose to apply the general QALY weights 
as they can already be found in existing Health Economics literature. The costs of assessing the QALY weights 
in all separate cases in our view would be very high. 
70 See also Czabanski 2008, 45; Pinto-Prades, Loomes & Breij 2009, 553. 
71 Chan & Chan, 2003, 17; Weir et al., 2008. 
72 The amounts in this section are expressed in Euros from 2014 by using the annual average inflation rates 
published by Eurostat. For more examples, see Karapanou & Visscher, 2010 and Karapanou, 2014. 
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In England, the amounts that have been awarded as pain and suffering damages for amputation 
of one leg below the knee range between £81,259 and £110,320 (approximately €100,800 - 
€136,800).73 In the Netherlands, a 31 year old motor driver whose lower leg was amputated 
received about €64,446 in a settlement, whereas a 54 year old woman whose leg was amputated 
just above the knee received €49,937.74 Another woman received about €18,450 for the 
immaterial losses incurred after the amputation of her lower leg. She was able to alleviate her 
condition by using a prosthetic limb.75 In Germany a trolley driver received €13,800 regarding 
the amputation of his forefoot for which he was comparatively negligent by 50%.76 In another 
traffic accident case, the court awarded the amount of €44,300 for pain and suffering to a young 
woman who had her lower leg amputated.77 In Greece, €194,000 was awarded to a 27 year old 
man after a car accident which resulted in the amputation of his leg right under the knee.78 In 
another case, a minor received about €206,000 in pain and suffering damages for amputation 
just below the knee.79 A 32 year old man who was involved in a work-related accident and had 
his lower leg amputated, received €68,900.80 In Italy, a man received €154,000 in pain and 
suffering damages for amputation of his foot.81 
There exists extensive Health Economics research regarding the cost-effectiveness of 
medication and other types of treatment for these health conditions, in which the QALY loss 
related to amputation of a lower limb has been elicited. Amputation of lower extremities is 
usually performed to patients of arteriosclerosis, whose lower limbs receive insufficient blood 
supply due to their arteries’ blockage.82 Diabetes patients can likewise be potential candidates 
for lower leg amputation, as diabetes may also cause a hardening of the arteries.83 In a study it 
is investigated whether amputation of lower limbs or revascularization is more cost-effective 
to deal with vascular disease.84 The QALY-weights relating to amputation of lower leg and 
revascularization are elicited by using the time trade-off from patients of vascular disease, who 
experience pain and difficulty in walking.85 The QALY-weights of being cured after single or 
multiple revascularization are 0.95 and 0.9 respectively, indicating that there is a residual loss 
in quality of life even after the treatment, which relates to the experience of the vascular disease. 
On the other hand, the QALY-weight after incurring a successful amputation of the lower limb 
that restores the ambulation of the patient is 0.6. The difference between these QALY-weights 
therefore reflects the net loss incurred in quality of life due to amputation of lower limb, which 
 
73 Judicial Studies Board, 2013, 59. The amounts are converted to British Pounds Sterling from 2014 on the 
basis of the annual average inflation rates published by Eurostat and converted to Euros from 2014 by using the 
annual average exchange rate of 2014 published by European Central Bank. UK Pound Sterling/Euro=0.80612. 
74 ANWB, 2015, 36. 
75 ANWB, 2015, 31. 
76 Jaeger & Luckey, 2008, 779. 
77 The plaintiff claimed €50,000 but because of the poor financial situation and the lack of insurance of the injurer, 
who was the boyfriend of the victim, the court only granted €40,000. Jaeger & Luckey, 2008, 776. 
78 Drama Court of First Instance 124/2004. 
79 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 2601/2006, Armenopoulos 2007, p. 1921.  
80 Areios Pagos (Supreme Court) 961/2007.  
81 Corte di Cassazione (Highest Court of Appeal) n. 25751/2008.   
82 Harker, 2006. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Brothers et al., 1999. 
85 Brothers et al., 1999, 64. 
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ranges from 0.3 to 0.35. Other publications find the QALY loss related to amputation of lower 
extremities to be around 0.286 and 0.39 QALYs.87 Another study found that the difference in 
QALY value between diabetes patients after primary healing of a foot ulcer and diabetes 
patients who have healed with major amputation is 0.29.88 This QALY-weight indicates the 
net effect of amputation to the quality of life of the patients. The QALY-research was executed 
by sending an EQ-5D questionnaire to patients who had been treated for foot ulcers in the 
previous four years.  
Applying a QALY-loss of 0.29 - 0.35 and a monetary value of €50,000 per QALY, with an 
average life expectancy of 80 years, the total loss in QALYs in a case involving a 54 year old 
victim like the one in the Netherlands, would result in a net present value of pain and suffering 
damages of about €246,000 – €297,000.89 
 
 
 6.2 Vertebral fracture / Spinal injury 
 
In Germany €13,500 was awarded to a 30 year old man who suffered a vertebral fracture which 
resulted in a displacement of his spinal canal, whereas pain and suffering damages of €21,500 
were awarded to a 65 year old woman for a vertebral fracture which resulted in a restriction of 
the spinal canal.90 In another case, a 19 year old received €32,300 as well as a monthly 
allowance of €100 for pain and suffering damages due to multiple vertebrae fractures.91 In the 
Netherlands, a 35 year old woman who suffered a severe vertebra fracture received €15,831 in 
pain and suffering damages, whereas a 45 year old man who suffered an impression fracture of 
a lumbar vertebra received €20,329.92 In Greece a 36 year old man received €43,760 regarding 
multiple vertebrae fractures for which he was comparatively negligent by 60%.93 The court 
took into account his serious remaining health problems and the permanent health impairment 
caused by the fractures. 
Vertebral fractures are common injuries occurring as a result of car accidents, falls, sports etc. 
They usually cause temporary disability while their most serious complication is spinal cord 
injury, which can result in paralysis. There is extensive literature in Health Economics in which 
the costs and quality of life reduction for osteoporosis related fractures is estimated. In a study 
from 2006, the decrease in quality of life due to a vertebral fracture is assessed at 0.20.94 For a 
person with a remaining life expectancy of 51 years (such as the case of the 30 year man from 
the German case) who suffers a vertebral fracture with remaining problems for the rest of his 
 
86 Patel, 1999; CDA Cost-Effectiveness Group, 2002. 
87 Visser, 2003. 
88 Ragnarson Tellvall & Apelqvist, 2000, 238. 
89 The net present value of 27 annual payments of €14,500 resp. €17,500 (0.29 resp. 0.35 * €50,000), applying a 
discount factor of 4% equals €246,250 resp. €297,198.  
90 Hacks, Ring & Böhm, 2009, 329, 391. 
91 Hacks, Ring & Böhm, 2009, 598. 
92 ANWB, 2015, 83ff. 
93 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 787/2009. 
94 Ström et al., 2008, 276. This QALY-weight is elicited from patients using the generic measure EQ-5D 24 
months after the fracture occurred. When patients were asked only four months after the injury, the reported 
decrease was 0.26. This difference in our view may reflect adaptation by the patients. 
  18 
life, applying the €50,000 dollar estimate per QALY would result in pain and suffering 
damages of about €225,000.95 However, if the fracture is expected to heal completely after 
some time so that the immaterial loss experienced is only temporary, pain and suffering 
damages based on the QALY approach can also reflect this. For a person incurring a vertebral 
fracture which is expected to heal in two years, pain and suffering damages would amount to 
approximately €19,600.96  
 
 
6.3 Loss of an eye  
 
Pain and suffering damages for the loss of an eye greatly differ per country. In England, the 
amounts that have been awarded for the complete loss of sight in one eye range between 
£45,482 and £54,398, i.e. approximately from €56,400 to €67,500.97 In the Netherlands, a 17 
year old was hit in the right eye with an air gun and incurred total loss of sight. He received an 
amount of €26,557 for pain and suffering.98 In a work-related accident, a 24 year old received 
€18,007 for loss of an eye.99 In Germany a woman who suffered from inflammation of the 
cerebral membrane due to her contact lenses and was blinded to one eye received €22,100 in 
pain and suffering damages.100 A much higher amount of €138,500 was awarded to a 12 year 
old boy. He lost an eye in an accident for which he was found comparatively negligent by 1/3. 
The fact that he has lost an eye at such a young age, which forces him to constantly be careful 
in order to protect his remaining eye, has increased the award granted.101 In another case, a 15 
year old was granted €15,000 for losing sight in the right eye.102In Greece, a 43 year old mother 
of two received about €103,300 in pain and suffering damages for complete loss of vision in 
her left eye.103 In another Greek case, €97,000 was awarded to a 36 year old man who was 
injured to one eye by a flare and lost 80% of his vision104. However, a 46 year old Greek man 
whose left eye was destroyed after someone kicked him in the face only received about 
€36,400.105 In Italy, the court of Pisa awarded €156,000 to a 43 year old man who lost sight in 
his right eye in a hunting accident.106 In another case, a man incurred a retinal rupture of his 
right eye during practicing kung fu. Eventually, vision in the injured eye was lost despite the 
 
95 The net present value of 51 annual payments of €10,000 (0.2 * €50,000), applying a discount factor of 4% 
equals €224,821. Note that if we would apply a QALY loss of 0.26 in the first year or in the first two years, to 
reflect that adaptation has not yet taken place the total amount would be about €3,000 (one year) resp. €6,000 
(two years) higher. 
96 The net present value of 2 annual payments of €10,000 (0.2 * €50,000), applying a discount factor of 4% 
equals €19,615. 
97 Judicial Studies Board, 2013, 16. The amounts are converted to British Pounds from 2014 on the basis of the 
annual average inflation rates published by Eurostat and converted to Euro 2014 by using the annual average 
exchange rate of 2014 published by European Central Bank. UK Pound Sterling/Euro=0.80612. 
98 ANWB, 2015, 65. 
99 ANWB, 2015, 64. 
100 Jaeger, & Luckey, 2008, 441. 
101 Jaeger, & Luckey, 2008, 423. 
102 OLG Koblenz 18.3.2004 5U 1134/03 NJW-RR 2004, 1025. 
103 Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Council of State) 2739/2007. 
104 Athens Administrative Court of First Instance 3441/2006. 
105 Dodekanese Court of Appeal 307/2005. 
106 Tribunale di Pisa (Pisa Court of First Instance), 1 July 2009, n.189/2002 R.G. 
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effort and the eye surgeries he underwent in the meantime. The court granted him an amount 
of about €73,500 plus interest since the date of the vision loss.107  
Losing sight in one eye may be the unfortunate outcome of an eye injury, as illustrated in the 
cases above or it may result from a disease that affects the eye such as cataract, diabetes, 
glaucoma et cetera. There exists extensive Health Economics research investigating the cost-
effectiveness of surgery and other types of treatment for these health conditions. In a 
publication from 2001, Brown et al. investigate whether people with good vision in both eyes 
have a higher quality of life than people who have good vision only in one eye. According to 
the results the difference in quality of life between good vision in both eyes and good vision in 
one eye is 0.08.108 This estimate regarding the difference in quality of life between good vision 
of both eyes versus good vision of one eye only has been corroborated in other studies.109 From 
yet another publication regarding cost-utility analysis of cataract surgery we see that the QALY 
gain of a cataract surgery to the second eye after a successful treatment of the first eye is 
assessed at 0.109 per year.110 We use the QALY-difference that was corroborated in several 
studies, namely the difference of 0.08 between seeing with one eye and seeing with two eyes 
as an estimate for the loss of the quality of life if one loses sight in one eye. For a person with 
a remaining life expectancy of about 37 years (such as the 43 year old man from the Italian 
case), applying a monetary value of €50,000 per QALY would result in pain and suffering 
damages of about €77,500.111 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In our view, the conclusion from the insurance theory that non-pecuniary losses should not be 
compensated because a rational victim is not willing to self-insure against such losses neglects 
the fact that people are willing to spend resources on reducing the probability of suffering such 
losses. Ex ante damages are an expression of this WTP. In the Law and Economics literature, 
the Value of a Statistical Life is used as an example of such damages, but this literature does 
not offer a way with which ex ante damages for non-fatal accidents can be assessed. We think 
that QALYs offer this systematic framework for assessing pain and suffering damages.  
When comparing the results of the proposed approach with awards that are actually awarded 
in Germany, Italy, Greece, England and the Netherlands, it turns out that the QALY approach 
results in (much) higher amounts. The QALY approach enables a better ‘relative ranking’ of 
injuries than the current legal methods. We believe that information about the quality of life 
derived by specialized research forms a better basis to determine pain and suffering damages 
than the amounts previously granted by courts. QALYs in our view are therefore able to 
improve the legal approach to pain and suffering damages for personal injuries, as well as the 
way in which Law and Economics handles such non-pecuniary losses. 
 
107 Cassazione Civile sez. III (Supreme Court section II), 21 April 2011, n. 9147. 
108 Brown et al., 2001, 644. 
109 E.g. see e.g. Clarke, 2002. 
110 Busbee et al., 2003, 2310-2317. 
111 The net present value of 38 annual payments of €4000 (0.08 * €50,000), applying a discount factor of 4%, 
equals €77,471. 
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